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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past twenty-five to thirty years, Internet usage has increased at lightning speed.
1
 In 
a 1995 survey, only 14% of adults (those individuals age eighteen and over) reported that they 
had ever used a computer to connect to the Internet on a regular basis.
2
 In stark comparison, a 
recent survey reported that as of May 2011, 78% of adults (those individuals age eighteen and 
over) now use the Internet regularly.
3
 When considering only those individuals who live in high-
income households (those households making $75,000 or more a year), the number of adults 
using the Internet regularly jumps to 96%.
4
 
Among those adults who are now using the Internet regularly, the Internet is increasingly 
                                                        
1
  See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.  
2
  Internet Adoption, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, http://www.pewinternet.org/Trend-
Data/Internet-Adoption.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining that the 14% of adults who reported in 
1995 that they had ever used a computer to connect to the Internet included those individuals who said that they 
had ever used “a home, work or school computer and modem to connect to computer bulletin boards, 
information services such as CompuServe or Prodigy, or computers at other locations”).  
3
  Who’s Online: Internet User Demographics, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data/Whos-Online.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).  
4
  Id.  
 2 
being utilized as a way to get news, shop, socialize, and network.
5
 While the “Millennial 
Generation” (those individuals born in 1977-1992) is still significantly more likely than older 
generations to engage in several online activities, such as social networking and blogging, older 
generations are making notable gains in these areas.
6
 For example, in recent years, the fastest rate 
of growth in social networking came from the “G.I. Generation” (those individuals born before 
1937).
7
  Between 2008 and 2010, the rate of social network site usage for the G.I. Generation 
quadrupled from 4% to 16%.
8
  While younger Internet users remain the most active participants 
in social networking services and other online activities, some Internet activities are becoming 
more uniformly popular across all age groups.
9
 The most uniformly popular uses of the web 
being email and search engines.
10
  
Undoubtedly, the continuous development of Internet technologies and uses – including 
the introduction of Web 2.0 – has contributed to the substantial growth in Internet usage over 
time. “Web 2.0” is commonly used to refer to “applications that facilitate interactive information 
sharing, interoperability, user-centered design, and collaboration."
11
 One of the significant 
features of these Web 2.0 technologies is that they allow users to upload their own (“user-
                                                        
5
  See Kristen Purcell, Search and email still top the list of most popular online activities, PEW INTERNET & AM. 
LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, 2 (Aug. 9, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Search-and-
Email.pdf (reporting that between 2002 and 2011 there was an increase in the number of Internet users who use 
the web to get news, buy products, and go on social networking sites).  
6
  See Kathryn Zickuhr, Generations 2010, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT SURVEY, 2 (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Generations_and_Tech10.pdf (reporting that in 
addition to use of social networking sites, “Milliennials” also surpass older generations when it comes to the use 
of instant messaging, using online classifieds, listening to music, playing online games, reading blogs and 
participating in virtual worlds).  
7
  Id. at 3.    
8
  Id.    
9
  Id. at 2 (reporting that the Internet activities that are becoming more uniformly popular across all age groups 
include email, search engine use, seeking health information, getting news, buying products, making travel 
reservations or purchases, doing online banking, looking for religious information, rating products, services, or 
people, making online charitable donations, and downloading podcasts).  
10
  Purcell, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that as of May 2011, “92% of online adults use search engines to find 
information on the Web and . . . 92% use email”); Zickuhr, supra note 6, at 11 (reporting that as of 2010, 87% 
of online adults use search engines and 94% use email).  
11
  KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW § 8.01 (2011), available at Lexis 1-8 ALMIOL § 8.01 (quoting 
another source) (citation omitted).  
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generated”) content onto the Internet for other users to see.12 The immensely popular websites 
Facebook,
13
 YouTube,
14
 and Wikipedia
15
 are all examples of Web 2.0 applications.
16
 
Web 2.0 has also led to the development of more explicit websites – sometimes referred 
to as “Porn 2.0”17 – where users upload pornographic materials that they have created onto the 
Internet.
18
 Naturally, once these user-generated materials have been uploaded, they are 
potentially available for anyone who logs onto the Internet to see.
19
 Thus, in light of the extreme 
popularity of Porn 2.0 websites,
20
 postings on these sites can have detrimental and long-lasting 
effects on a person’s reputation,21 career,22 mental health, etc., and have led to harassment and 
threats of violence.
23
  
There are a number of reasons why an individual would upload their own pornographic 
                                                        
12
  See generally Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0, O’REILLY MEDIA INC. (Sept. 30, 2005), 
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html. 
13
  FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
14
  YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
15
  WIKIPEDIA, http://www.wikipedia.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).  
16
  See Web 2.0, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_2.0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).  
17
  See PORNOTUBE, INC., http://PornoTube.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2011), REDTUBE, http://www.RedTube.com 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2011), and YOUPORN, http://www.YouPorn.com (last visited Nov. 30, 2011) for examples 
of Porn 2.0 websites. 
18
  See generally Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 
799 (2008); Ariel Ronneburger, Sex, Privacy, and WebPages: Creating A Legal Remedy for Victims of Porn 
2.0, 21 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 2 (2009).  
19
  See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 8.  
20
  Alexa.com, a website that measures the popularity of websites, calculates that one of the most popular Porn 2.0 
websites, YouPorn, is the eighty-second most visited site in the world, and the eighty-eighth most visited site in 
the United States. See Youporn.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/youporn.com (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2011). 
21
  See A.G. Sulzberger, In Small Towns, Gossip Moves To the Web, and Turns Vicious, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 
2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 18650902 (describing how anonymous posts on an online community 
forum damaged a couple’s reputation in the community, and ultimately lead to the couple’s decision to 
relocate).  
22
  See Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 
WLNR 28542997 (discussing how posts about female law students on an anonymous Internet defamation 
website resulted in threats of sexual violence and possible damage to the students’ professional reputations); 
Jeff Tyler, Get yourself a little online privacy, MARKETPLACE MONEY (Mar. 2, 2007), 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/03/02/an_online_identity/ (interviewing an ivy league law 
student who claimed that vulgar comments made about her on an online discussion board made it difficult for 
her to find a job).  
23
   See Brittan Heller, Note, Of Legal Rights and Moral Wrongs: A Case Study of Internet Defamation, 19 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 279, 282-83 (2007) (detailing how a well-known software programmer reacted to receiving 
anonymous online threats of sexual violence by canceling her scheduled public speaking events).  
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materials onto the Internet.
24
 Unfortunately, time and experience has demonstrated that their 
intentions are not always innocent.
25
 These sites are sometimes intentionally used as instruments 
for humiliation and revenge by jealous co-workers, scorned ex-partners, etc. For example, in 
2004 when Cecilia Barnes broke up with her long-term boyfriend, he turned to the Internet for 
revenge and posted fake Internet profiles in Ms. Barnes’ name, posting nude photos of Barnes 
and solicitations for sexual intercourse.
26
 Ms. Barnes only became aware of these unauthorized 
profiles and their content after she started to receive emails and phone calls from strangers 
soliciting her for sex.
27
  
Unfortunately, experiences like Ms. Barnes’ are not uncommon and as the number of 
user-generated websites has grown, it has become increasingly easy for Internet users to post 
pornographic materials of people who did not consent to the materials’ circulation.28 Of course, 
almost every adult in America has heard of celebrities, such as Pamela Anderson, who have sex 
tapes on the Internet despite the celebrity’s highly publicized efforts to suppress the videos.29 
However, in the case of unauthorized Porn 2.0 postings, celebrities are in a different a position 
compared to non-celebrities. For starters, celebrities generally have better financial resources to 
                                                        
24
  See Bartow, supra note 18, at 813.  
25
  See id.; see, e.g., Ex girlfriend revenge!, IHATESTACEY.COM,  http://www.ihatestacy.com/ (last visited on Oct. 
11, 2011) (a site that purportedly allows users to view private photos of the website author’s ex-girlfriend after 
the viewer refers a minimum number of people to the site); Get Revenge On Your Ex, 
GETREVENGEONYOUREX, http://www.getrevengeonyourex.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (a website that 
advertises to users that they can “Produce The Evidence [They] Need Or Just Humiliate [Their] Ex Like Never 
Before!” by offering to digitally alter photos that a user has uploaded to create a “special photo” such as a 
“photograph of [their] ex with another person, in a compromising pose, being violated or anything else [the 
user] can think of!”); Revenge Pics Of You Ex, FREE-REVENGE-IDEAS.COM, http://www.free-revenge-
ideas.com/Revenge-Pics-Of-Your-Ex.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) (a website “designed” to allow users to 
share photos and stories about their exes and encourages users to upload the “funniest or meanest” of these 
materials).  
26
  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).  
27
  See id. 
28
  See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 3. 
29
  See Ann W. O’Neill, Big Names Lose a Few Rounds During a Litigious Year, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1997, at B1, 
available at 1997 WLNR 5646344 (reporting that although Pamela Anderson and her husband, Tommy Lee, 
“spent an extraordinary amount of time” trying to suppress a sex tape from the couple’s honeymoon from being 
released, the video was ultimately made available to subscribers to certain adult websites and would be released 
in hard copy in the future).  
 5 
fund litigation.
30
 Additionally, from a purely economic standpoint, one can question whether 
celebrities actually suffer any damage as a result of the unauthorized release of their explicit 
materials.
31
 For example, when Paris Hilton and Kim Kardashian’s sex tapes were “leaked” to 
the public, each of these celebrities not only experienced a new level of fame, but they both 
reportedly cut a deal for a percentage of the proceeds.
32
  
In comparison, a non-celebrity is unlikely to experience any benefit – commercial or 
otherwise – when they become a victim of an unauthorized and explicit posting on the Internet. 
However, they are very likely to experience the destructive consequences of these sites.
33
 The 
unfortunate reality is that for a victim of Porn 2.0, the potential for recovery is extremely limited, 
and the road to any recovery at all will be challenging.
34
 
 
II.   POTENTIAL RECOVERY AGAINST THE POSTING PARTY 
When a person becomes the victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, they may be able 
to bring suit for damages under traditional tort theories such as defamation, invasion of privacy, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
35
 Some courts have already applied these 
traditional tort theories to redress economic, reputational, or privacy-based injuries arising from 
                                                        
30
  See Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship Privacy Through Implied Contracts of 
Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 895 (2006).  
31
  Id. (“[G]iven the value of publicity and the tapes themselves, one might question what harm celebrities suffer 
from this type of ‘embarrassing’ disclosure.”).  
32
  See IAN C. BALLON, E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 12.07[8][C] (2d ed. 2011), available at Westlaw 
ECOMMINTLAW (stating that the sex tape involving celebrities Kim Kardashian and Ray J was released 
“amid rumors that the participants had cut a deal for a percentage of the proceeds”); McClurg, supra note 30 
(“Paris Hilton reportedly cashed in on the sex tape that made her a household name.”); see also Richard 
Johnson, Happy Ending, N.Y. POST, May 1, 2007, at 12, available at 2007 WLNR 8222999 (reporting that Kim 
Kardashian dropped her lawsuit against Vivid Entertainment over the release of her sex tap with Ray J in 
exchange for $5,000,000).  
33
  See generally sources cited supra notes 21-23.  
34
  See discussion infra Parts II and III.  
35
  See discussion infra Part II.A-C.  
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conduct on the Internet.
36
 However, applying these theories to conduct on the Internet has posed 
some challenges because cybertorts do not involve the traditional categories of injury covered by 
tort law “such as automobile accidents, slip and fall mishaps, medical malpractice, or injuries 
due to dangerously defective products.”37  
Thus, as a threshold matter, it is prudent to recognize some of the general procedural 
challenges that arise when a Porn 2.0 victim desires to bring an action in tort against his or her 
primary tortfeasor due to the special context of cybertorts and the general nature of tort law.
38
 
For example, because tort law is created by state law,
39
 where a Porn 2.0 victim files suit, and 
thus which state’s law applies to his/her action, will determine whether the victim can even 
attempt to pursue a particular cause of action.
40
 Further, the law applicable to a particular suit 
will also determine a Porn 2.0 victim’s burden of proof because causes of action in tort vary 
among the states where they are recognized. Lastly, even where a particular cause of action is 
recognized under the governing law, a Porn 2.0 victim might have difficulty naming the 
appropriate defendant due to issues of online anonymity and pseudonymity.
41
  
When an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting is made anonymously, a victim of the post may 
apply to have a court “serve a subpoena duces tucum ([or] ‘John Doe subpoena’) directed to [an] 
Internet service provider[] to unveil the identity of [the] anonymous [poster].”42 However, 
generally speaking, “[c]ourts will not issue a subpoena duces tecum unless the ISP gives notice 
                                                        
36
   See MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, INTERNET LAW IN A NUTSHELL 143 (2009). 
37
   Id.  
38
  See infra text accompanying notes 39-41.  
39
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 5 cmt. a (1977); BALLON, supra note 36, at §§ 12.02[1], 37.01.  
40
  See BALLON, supra note 32, at §§ 12.02[1], 37.01.  
41
  See id. at §§ 1.06[2], 12.02[1]; see also RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169 (discussing the difficultly of pursuing 
online libel suits for anonymous website postings); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 268 (2005) (“[T]he relative anonymity the Internet fosters 
makes remedies against primary malfeasors less effective than in the brick-and-mortar context.”).  
42
  RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169.  
 7 
to the anonymous speaker and an opportunity to be heard.”43 In effect, this means that a Porn 2.0 
victim has to wait to see if a court will order the ISP to unveil the identity of the anonymous 
poster while the court balances the rights of the anonymous poster against a Porn 2.0 victim’s 
right to vindicate his or her tort rights and remedies.
44
 Ultimately, there is no guarantee that a 
court will find the balance to tip in favor of a Porn 2.0 victim.
45
 In one case, the court not only 
refused to issue a subpoena to compel the anonymous Internet speakers’ identities, but also 
“issued a protective order noting these persons demonstrated intent to remain anonymous by 
refraining from disclosing their identities with their email addresses.”46 
Assuming that a Porn 2.0 victim is able to overcome these threshold challenges to 
bringing an action in tort based on conduct in the Internet, they may have a cause of action for 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The substance 
of each of these tort theories, and their potential application in the Porn 2.0 context to a primary 
tortfeasor – i.e., the person who first posts the explicit content on the Internet - is described in 
detail below.
47
  
A.  Defamation: 
Under certain circumstances, a victim of an unauthorized posting on a Porn 2.0 website 
may successfully pursue a claim of defamation against the party who originally posted the 
unauthorized content on the Internet.
48
 Particularly, this common law tort may be utilized to 
redress any statements in the unauthorized posting that injured the Porn 2.0 victim’s reputation in 
                                                        
43
  Id.   
44
  See id. at 169-171.  
45
  But see Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
101, 108 n.31 (2011) (“Absent specific efforts to hide their IP address, however, users can often be identified 
through records kept by intermediaries.”).  
46
  See id. at 170 (discussing Anderson v. Hale, 2001 WL 503045 (N.D. Ill. 2001)).   
47
  See discussion infra Part II.A-C.  
48
  See discussion infra Part II.A.  
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the community.
49
   
Defamation is defined as “the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false 
statement to a third person.”50 When such statements are made in a fixed medium – such as the 
Internet – they are actionable under the defamation tort of libel.51 Libel generally requires: “[(1)] 
a false and defamatory statement concerning another; [(2)] an unprivileged publication to a third 
party; [(3)] fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and [(4)] either 
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused 
by the publication.”52  
Courts have recognized that certain defamatory statements are so extreme that “special 
harm” i.e., “loss of something having economic or pecuniary value”53 – need not be proven by a 
plaintiff.
54
 These extreme statements are considered  “per se defamatory.”55 “An attack on the 
integrity and moral character of a [plaintiff] is libelous per se."
56
 Additionally, courts have held 
that “[f]alse statements and distorted pictures that disgrace plaintiffs or injure their careers, 
                                                        
49
  RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 169.  
50
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
51
  See Wesley Burrell, I Am He As You Are He As You Are Me: Being Able to Be Yourself, Protecting the Integrity 
of Identity Online, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 705, 717 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) 
(1977) (“Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment 
in physical form or by any other form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic 
of written or printed words.”). 
52
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). But see Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Annotation, Individual 
and Corporate Liability for Libel and Slander in Electronic Communications, Including E-mail, Internet and 
Websites, 3 A.L.R.6TH 153 § 4 (2005) (providing that in an action for electronic defamation, some courts have 
held that a plaintiff “must make a demand in writing to the party that published a defamatory statement prior to 
bringing the action”). 
53
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. b (1977) (“The words ‘actionable per se’ are used . . . to denote 
the fact that the publication is of such a character as to make the publisher liable for defamation although no 
special harm results from it, unless the defamatory matter is true or the defamer was privileged to publish it.”).  
54
  See id. at §§ 558, 569 cmt. b. 
55
  Id. 
56
  Wilson v. IBP, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 1996).  
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constitute defamation per se.”57 When a statement is of such a nature that it falls within one of 
these “established categories of per se defamation, ‘the law presumes that damages will result, 
and they need not be alleged or proven.’”58 In other words, a defamatory statement that is 
actionable per se may result in liability for defamation even though the plaintiff has not suffered 
any loss of economic or pecuniary value.
59
 Further, where a plaintiff can establish that a 
defendant’s statements are defamatory per se, proof of falsity and malice will also be 
presumed.
60
 
In the context of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, this means that a victim of the posting 
may be able to establish that the challenged posting was libelous per se if the content of the 
posting was altered, or in any way distorted, before it was uploaded onto the internet.
61
 For 
example, X, may have a successful libel claim against her ex-boyfriend, Y, if Y used Photoshop 
(or any other photo editing program or tools) to alter a photo of X and then posted the altered 
photo on the Internet. If X can establish that the altered photo attacked X’s integrity and moral 
character, disgraced X, and/or injured X’s career, Y’s posting of the altered photograph may 
amount to libel per se.
62
 As a result, a court would presume that each of the prima facie elements 
of X’s libel claim exist.63 This is the result that a court found where the defendant had altered a 
photograph of the plaintiff - to make it appear that the plaintiff intentionally exposed her breasts - 
                                                        
57
  Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 87 (2009) (citing cases); see also Wilson, 558 
N.W.2d at 139 (quoting Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994)) (“In addition, we have recognized 
that ‘slanderous imputations affecting a person in his or her business, trade, profession, or office are also 
actionable without proof of actual harm.’”).  
58
  Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 
1992)).  
59
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 569 cmt. b (1977). 
60
  Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 175 (Iowa 2004) (citing Vinson v. Linn-Mar Cmty. Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 
108, 115-16 (Iowa 1995)) (“In statements that are libelous per se, falsity, malice, and injury are presumed and 
proof of these elements is not necessary.”).  
61
  Citron, supra note 57, at 87 (citing cases). 
62
  See generally sources cited supra notes 56-57.  
63
  See Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d at 175, 178.  
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and then e-mailed the picture to the plaintiff’s colleagues.64 Once the jury found that the altered 
photograph of the plaintiff was libelous per se, the court acknowledged that the law conclusively 
presumed the existence of damage to the plaintiff's reputation.
65
 Thus, the court proceeded to 
allow the jury to award the plaintiff damages without requiring that she prove any actual damage 
to her reputation.
66
  
On the other hand, a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting will be less likely to 
succeed on a claim of libel if they cannot establish that the content of the posting has never been 
altered.
67
 In order for a statement to be actionable as defamation, the statement must be both 
false and defamatory.
68
 As the commentary to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS explains: 
“There can be no recovery in defamation for a statement of fact that is true, although the 
statement is made for no good purpose and is inspired by ill will toward the person about whom 
it is published and is made solely for the purpose of harming him.”69 Thus, no matter how 
malicious the posting party’s motives were, if the content of a Porn 2.0 post has never been 
altered or distorted, the post will need to have a false caption (or similar description, title, etc.) in 
order for the post to satisfy the falsity element of defamation.
70
 
In sum, because a plaintiff can only recover on a claim of defamation if the offending 
statements are both false and defamatory,
71
 a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery on a claim of 
defamation is limited. In order for a Porn 2.0 victim to have a viable defamation claim, he or she 
                                                        
64
  Id. at 169-70, 178 (upholding the district court’s finding of libel per se after finding substantial evidence existed 
to support the jury’s finding).  
65
  Id. 
66
  Id. 
67
  See infra text accompanying notes 68-69.  
68
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. a (1977) (“To create liability for defamation there must be 
publication of matter that is both defamatory and false.”).  
69
  Id. (also noting however that “[s]everal states have constitutional or statutory provisions” under which “truth of 
a defamatory statement of fact is not a defense if the statement is published for ‘malicious motives’ or if it is not 
published for ‘justifiable ends’ or on a matter of public concern”).  
70
  See generally id.  
71
  See generally id.  
 11 
will ultimately need to establish that before the offending photo or video was posted onto the 
Internet, the posting party edited the original content of the post. Without a showing that such 
content was distorted, altered, etc., the unauthorized post cannot be considered defamatory 
without being accompanied by some false caption, title, description, etc.
72
 
B.  Invasions of Privacy: 
In some instances, a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting may be able to bring suit 
alleging an invasion of his or her common law right to privacy.
73
 Generally speaking, there are 
four recognized common law privacy torts,
74
 three of which involve claims based on the public 
disclosure of private information:  (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private 
facts, and (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light.
75
 These three potential causes of 
action are discussed individually below.
76
 
1.  Intrusion upon Seclusion:  
The tort of unreasonable intrusion concerns invasions of a person’s interest in solitude or 
seclusion.
77
 Generally speaking, to establish a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion, a 
plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of “an intentional intrusion by the defendant;” (2) that 
the intrusion was “into a matter which the plaintiff has a right to keep private;” and (3) that the 
                                                        
72
  See supra text accompanying notes 67-70. 
73
  See discussion infra Part II.B.  
74
  See Patricia Sanchez Abril, “A Simple, Human Measure of Privacy”: Public Disclosure of Private Facts in the 
World of Tiger Woods, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 385, 389 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
652A (1977). 
75
  BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.02[3][A]. 
76
  See discussion infra Part.II.B.2. I have chosen not to discuss the substance and potential application of the 
fourth recognized privacy tort - appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness – in this paper because 
celebrities, which are not the focus of the paper, almost exclusively use this cause of action. See McClurg, supra 
note 30, at 895 (acknowledging that while the right of publicity and appropriation claims are not reserved for 
celebrities, they are commonly only used by celebrities).  
77
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977) (“The . . . invasion of privacy covered by 
[intrusion upon seclusion] . . . consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or 
seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable man.”).  
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intrusion was made “by the use of a method which is objectionable to the reasonable person.”78 
Thus, whether an unreasonable intrusion claim can be sustained, depends on the particular 
circumstances of the case, including whether the defendant acted intentionally, whether the 
alleged conduct constitutes an intrusion, and whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the space allegedly intruded by the defendant.
79
 
One context in which a plaintiff may have a viable claim for unreasonable intrusion is 
where the alleged tortfeasor took photos or videos of the plaintiff – without the plaintiff’s 
knowledge or consent - while the plaintiff was alone in their bedroom or bathroom.
80
 Courts 
have routinely held that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they are alone 
in these private areas.
81
 Thus, for example, if A installs a hidden video camera in B’s shower and 
records B while she is taking a shower, A has intentionally intruded B’s privacy. Under these 
facts, A may be subject to liability to B for tortuous intrusion, regardless of the content of the 
videotape,
82
 and regardless of whether A later publishes the videotape.
83
 Instead, A’s potential 
liability results from his act of recording of B, without her knowledge or consent, despite B’s 
                                                        
78
  62A AM. JUR. 2D PRIVACY § 39 (2011) (citing cases).  
79
  See generally id. 
80
  See generally In re Marriage of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Iowa 2008) (finding that the respondent wife 
“had a reasonable expectation that her activities in the bedroom of the home were private when she was alone in 
that room”); State v. Perez, 779 N.W.2d 105, 111 (Minn. Ct. App.) (finding that the “[defendant]’s wife had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from being surreptitiously videotaped by him while she was alone in their 
shared bathroom.”), review denied, A09-704, 2010 Minn. LEXIS 327 (Minn. June 15, 2010); Clayton v. 
Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Tex. App. 2001) (“When a person goes into the privacy of the bedroom, he or 
she has a right to the expectation of privacy in his or her seclusion.”). 
81
  See cases cited supra note 80. 
82
  See Tigges, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“The intentional, intrusive, and wrongful nature of [the defendant]'s conduct is 
not excused by the fact that the surreptitious taping recorded no scurrilous or compromising behavior.”).   
83
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977); see also Tiggs, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“[The Plaintiff] 
had no burden to prove the videotape was published to a third party without her consent.”); Clayton, 47 S.W.3d 
at 156 (“The fact that no later exposure occurs does not negate that potential and permit willful intrusion by 
such technological means into one's personal life in one's bedroom.”).  
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reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances.
84
  
Consequently, in the context of a Porn 2.0 victim, where the content of the unauthorized 
posting was recorded without the victim’s knowledge or consent, the victim may have a viable 
claim for unreasonable intrusion.
85
 A Porn 2.0 victim may also have a viable claim for 
unreasonable intrusion where the alleged tortfeasor obtained the content of the posting through 
the unauthorized access of the victim’s computer,86 or email.87 For example, in 2010, two 
students at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey, Dharun Ravi and Molly Wei, were 
charged with multiple counts of invasion of privacy for secretly placing a camera in another 
student’s dormitory room and later transmitting the encounter on the Internet.88 The day after the 
content was streamed over the Internet, the other student, Tyler Clementi, jumped to his death 
from the George Washington Bridge.
89
 Wei has already entered into a plea deal that dropped the 
two counts of invasion of privacy against her in exchange for her testimony against Ravi, 
Clementi’s roommate and the person who allegedly set up the online video.90 However, a New 
Jersey Superior Court Judge, Judge Glenn Berman, has already denied Ravi’s motion to dismiss 
the charges in his indictment.
91
 Whether Ravi will be found guilty for invasion of privacy is still 
                                                        
84
  See Tiggs, 758 N.W.2d at 830 (“The wrongfulness of the [defendant’s] conduct springs not from the specific 
nature of the recorded activities, but instead from the fact that [the plaintiff]'s activities were recorded without 
her knowledge and consent at a time and place and under circumstances in which she had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”).  
85
  See supra notes 80, 82-84 and accompanying text.  
86
  See BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.02[3][B].  
87
  RUSTAD, supra note 36, at 174.  
88
 Press Release, Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office, Two Rutgers students charged with invasion of privacy 
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.co.middlesex.nj.us/prosecutor/PressRelease/ (follow “Two Rutgers students 
charged with invasion of privacy” hyperlink).  
89
  Winnie Hu, Legal Debate Swirls Over Charges in a Student’s Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, at A15, 
available at 2010 WLNR 19567582.  
90
  Henrick Karoliszyn & Larry McShane, Tyler Clementi's parents give woman accused of driving son to suicide a 
break, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2011, at 10, available at 2011 WLNR 9105870.  
91
  Sue Epstein, Tyler Clementi suicide case: Defense attorneys appeal ruling that blocked review of personal 
writings, THE STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 22, 2011, at 17, available at 2011 WLNR 24288511.  
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to be determined and a trial date has been scheduled for February 2012.
92
 In the mean time, an 
appeals court has tentatively agreed to listen to arguments from Ravi’s attorneys as to why it 
should overturn Judge Berman’s decision not to dismiss the indictment.93 If Ravi is ultimately 
found guilty of invasion of Clementi’s privacy, however, the maximum sentence that could be 
imposed is five years.
94
  
Of course, whether the content of an unauthorized posting was recorded without the 
victim’s knowledge or consent, and/or through the unauthorized access of the victim’s computer, 
a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery is not premised on the fact that the posting party uploaded 
certain content onto the Internet.
95
 Instead, whether a Porn 2.0 victim will be will be able to 
sustain a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion ultimately depends on the circumstances 
under which the alleged tortfeasor obtained the content of his or her posting.
96
 Nonetheless, since 
a Porn 2.0 victim’s potential recovery is generally limited, under the proper facts, a Porn 2.0 
victim may utilize this theory to recover tort damages from the posting party.  
2.  Public Disclosure of Private Facts:  
On its face, the tort of public disclosure of private facts – which is implicated when 
private and highly offensive information is publicly disclosed without authorization
97
 - is a 
perfect cause of action to remedy a victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting.
98
  The public 
disclosure tort requires: (1) a public disclosure, (2) that the facts disclosed were private, (3) that 
the facts disclosed would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person, and (4) 
                                                        
92
  Id.  
93
  Id.   
94
  Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 379, 383 (2011) (“The cyberbullies, Ravi and Wei, were both charged by the New Jersey District 
Attorney's Office with invasion of privacy; however, under New Jersey law, ‘the most serious charges carry 
[only] a maximum sentence of five years.’”). 
95
  See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
96
  See supra text accompanying notes 78-80. 
97
  See Abril, supra note 74, at 390. 
98
  See generally McClurg, supra note 30, at 887, 887-88, 897-99. 
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that the facts disclosed were not of legitimate public concern.
99
 A victim of an unauthorized Porn 
2.0 posting could more than likely establish the first three of these elements.
100
 Uploading 
content onto the Internet would unquestionably constitute a public disclosure, and the sexual 
nature of the content undoubtedly constitutes a set of private facts the disclosure of which would 
be objectionable to a reasonable person.
101
  
However, a Porn 2.0 victim may be unable to find relief in the public disclosure tort due 
to the fourth element that a plaintiff must prove: the fact that the information disclosed was not 
newsworthy or of public concern.
102
 The challenge that this fourth element presents is rooted in 
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretations of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The First Amendment “generally bars the government from controlling the 
communication of information (either by direct regulation or through the authorization of private 
lawsuits), whether the communication is ‘fair’ or not.”103 Thus, if information about an 
individual, albeit its private nature, is determined to be “in the public interest,” disclosure of such 
information may not actionable, because the First Amendment grants the public the “right to 
know” about such information.104  
While the Supreme Court has never drawn a bright-line rule that a state can never punish 
                                                        
99
  See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D. Ca. 1998). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
100
  See infra note 101 and accompanying text.  
101
  It should be noted that once such content has been uploaded onto the Internet, naturally the content is no longer 
considered “private,” and thus any further postings of such content would not be actionable under the tort of 
public disclosure. Compare Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 840-41 (holding that the plaintiff celebrity couple had a 
right of privacy that extended to their sexual activities despite the fact that one of them was previously depicted 
in a widely distributed sex-tape with a third-party to the action), with Lee v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., No. CV96 
7069SVW (JGX), 1997 WL 33384309, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1997) (finding that the plaintiff celebrity 
couple’s explicit photographs were no longer private facts because the same photographs had previously been 
published). 
102
  See generally Abril, supra note 74, at 390; McClurg, supra note 30, at 888 (“In practice, however, this claim, 
known as the tort of ‘public disclosure of private facts,’ offers only a slight chance of recovery by plaintiffs.”).  
103
  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of A Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (footnote omitted). See generally U.S. 
CONST. amend. I.  
104
  BALLON, supra note 32, at § 12.05[4][B][i]. 
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truthful speech,
105
 the Court has adopted an extremely demanding standard for when a state can 
punish truthful speech.
106
 The Supreme Court announced in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing 
Co.,
107
 and has since affirmed, that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a 
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of 
the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”108 Courts have 
struggled to apply this standard,
109
 and scholars have argued that in effect, the Court may have 
left the public disclosure tort unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
110
  
In sum, in the context of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting, a victim may choose to bring 
suit against the party who posted the unauthorized content under a theory that the posting party 
publicly disclosed the victim’s private information. However, like any other plaintiff seeking to 
bring a public disclosure claim, a Porn 2.0 victim will bear a heavy burden in light of the onerous 
standard that the Supreme Court has announced in light of the First Amendment.
111
  However, 
ultimately, it seems that non-celebrities explicit materials should not, and could not, qualify as 
matters of public concern even under the Court’s Daily Mail standard. 
3.  Showing Plaintiff in a False Light 
The tort of false light invasion of privacy protects a person’s interest “in not being made 
                                                        
105
  See Florida Star v. B.F.J., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (“Nor need we accept appellant’s invitation to hold broadly 
that truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”).  
106
  See infra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.  
107
  443 U.S. 97 (1979).  
108
  Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (alteration in original) (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103).  
109
  See Abril, supra note 74, at 393 (“Subsequent courts have struggled with the contours of ‘public significance,’ 
‘public concern,’ and ‘newsworthiness,’ particularly in the context of celebrities. A judgment of the legitimacy 
and social value of information is often circular, as it can be determined by the market's demand and curiosity 
regarding the subject at hand.”).  
110
  See McClurg, supra note 30, at 888 (“Given the current state of the law, it is quite possible that the public 
disclosure tort is ‘unconstitutional’ under the First Amendment.”).  
111
  See supra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.  
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to appear before the public in an objectionable false light or false position.”112 In order for the 
publicity given to the plaintiff to be considered “objectionable,” the publicity must be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.
113
 Thus, a false light cause of action only arises “when the 
defendant knows that the plaintiff, as a reasonable [person], would be justified in the eyes of the 
community in feeling seriously offended and aggrieved by the publicity.”114 
In practice, there are four elements to a false light claim: (1) a false representation; (2) the 
representation gave "publicity" to the allegedly false matter; (3) the matter disseminated has a 
high degree of offensiveness; and (4) actual malice.
115
  Thus, as a threshold matter, in order for a 
representation to be actionable under a theory of false light invasion, the representation must be 
false.
116
 In the context of a Porn 2.0 victim, satisfying this threshold element may be challenging. 
Like a Porn 2.0 victim who seeks to establish a claim of defamation, a victim seeking to establish 
a false light invasion claim will need to prove that the content of the unauthorized posting was 
altered or distorted (or that any text accompanying the content is false). However, at the same 
time, a Porn 2.0 victim will only be able to recover under a false light theory if the victim can 
prove that despite the falsity of the challenged posting, the public is aware that he or she is the 
particular individual that is falsely depicted in the posting.
117
  
C.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: 
Finally, when an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting is made to intentionally cause the non-
                                                        
112
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977); see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 400 (1960)) (“‘The interest 
protected’ in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in a false light ‘is clearly that of reputation.’”).  
113
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c (1977). 
114
  Id.  
115
  See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, False light invasion of privacy -- cognizability and elements, 57 
A.L.R.4TH 22, § 2[a] (1987). 
116
  See Veilleux v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000); Levesque v. Doocy, 557 F. Supp. 2d 157, 
164 (D. Me. 2008) (“Only statements that are provable as false are actionable under defamation or false light 
invasion of privacy.”); State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 53 (Alaska 2007) (“Because opinions cannot be proved 
false, they cannot give rise to false light liability.”). 
117
  Donaldson, supra note 115, at § 22.  
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consenting participant to suffer emotional distress, such distress may form a basis for the victim 
to recover tort damages from the posting party.
118
  Generally speaking, an individual is subject to 
tort liability for the severe emotional distress that they intentionally or recklessly cause to 
another though their “extreme and outrageous conduct.”119 Thus, in order to establish a cause of 
action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish that: “(1) the 
defendant . . . acted intentionally or with reckless disregard of the consequences; (2) the 
defendant's conduct . . . [was] extreme or outrageous; (3) [they] . . . suffered severe emotional 
distress; and (4) the defendant's conduct . . . [was] the cause of such emotional distress.”120  
Courts have only found liability for intentional infliction of emotional harm when the 
alleged conduct “produces distress so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure 
it, and which itself is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all 
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community.”121 In the general context of the Internet, courts have found conduct amounting to 
this demanding standard when plaintiffs have alleged “[v]arious types of online harassment . . . 
including threats of violence, the publication of a victim's sensitive information, and disparaging 
racial remarks.”122  
In light of the popularity
123
 and the potentially severe consequences of Porn 2.0 
websites,
124
 it is certainly plausible that that under the proper facts, a court may find that a 
                                                        
118
  Note that in most jurisdictions, even if a victim’s severe emotional distress was not inflicted intentionally or 
recklessly, the victim may be able to recovery for the negligent infliction of their emotional harm. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965). 
119
  Id. at § 46(1).   
120
  Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Claims for Vicarious and Individual Liability for Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Derived from Use of Internet and Electronic Communications, 30 A.L.R.6TH 241, § 2 (2008).  
121
  Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).  
122
  Citron, supra note 57, at 88 (citing cases).  
123
  See supra note 20.    
124
  See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.  
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scorned co-worker or ex-lover who posts explicit photos or videos of another on the Internet, is 
liable for the emotional distress they may cause as a result. However, whether a Porn 2.0 victim 
suffers distress so severe as to make it actionable, will ultimately depend on the circumstances 
surrounding the particular unauthorized posting including the outrageousness surrounding the 
unauthorized posting.
125
  
D.  Conclusion: 
A victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting may seek to recover tort damages from the 
party who first posted the content on the Internet through traditional tort claims of defamation, 
invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
126
 However, a victim who 
chooses to bring such claims will undoubtedly face various procedural and substantive 
challenges including questions of the cognizability of a particular tort claim under state law,
127
 
the potential inability to identify a primary tortfeasor who has posted anonymously,
128
 and/or 
demonstrating a heavy burden of proof.
129
  
Even if a Porn 2.0 victim is ultimately successful in bringing a tort action against their 
primary tortfeasor, the monetary amount of their recovery will likely be unable to compensate 
the victim for the damages that they have sustained.
130
 Further, any recovery that a Porn 2.0 
victim may receive from the posting party, will do nothing to remedy the root of plaintiff’s 
damages: the unauthorized posting will still be available for anyone who logs onto the Internet to 
see.  
 
 
                                                        
125
  See supra text accompanying note 121.  
126
  See discussion supra Part II.A-C.  
127
  See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.  
128
  See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.  
129
  See discussion supra Part II.A-C.  
130
  See Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 3.  
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III.  POTENTIAL RECOVERY AGAINST INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
Theoretically, an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”)131 is in a better position to remedy a 
victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 positing than the party who originally posted the content on 
the Internet. Generally speaking, advances in information technology have made it increasingly 
cost effective for these intermediaries to monitor the activities of those who use their networks 
more closely.
132
 
When an individual discovers that he or she is the victim of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 
posting, understandably, one of the individual’s foremost concerns is the immediate removal of 
the posting from the Internet. But notably, an ISP is capable of preventing, from the onset, the 
distribution of the unauthorized content on a website that the ISP hosts. For example, when a 
user uploads content for distribution through a Porn 2.0 website, the ISP for the site could simply 
require verified consent from all participants in the photo/video before the content can be made 
available for other users to see. However, if unauthorized content does end up on Porn 2.0 site, 
the ISP who hosts the site can prevent the content from further dissemination on the Internet in 
ways that the posting party cannot.
133
 For example, an ISP could refuse to send the packets of 
information containing the unauthorized content, it could delete the content completely, or the 
ISP could edit the photo or video (and any captions) so that the non-consenting participant is no 
longer recognizable.
134
 Moreover, unlike an Internet user, an ISP can easily be identified and it 
has the resources to pay money damages and thereby compensate Porn 2.0 victims for harm that 
they have suffered as a result of an unauthorized Porn 2.0 posting.
135
 
                                                        
131
  For the remainder of this paper, I use the term “ISP” to broadly refer to those “interactive computer services” 
that are potentially immune under § 230. See supra text accompanying notes 138-41. 
132
  Mann & Belzley, supra note 41, at 268.  
133
  Wu, supra note 45, at 107.  
134
  See id. at 107-08.  
135
  See id. at 108.  
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However, in practice, once unauthorized materials are uploaded onto the Internet, there is 
no legal mechanism by which a Porn 2.0 victim can require an ISP to take down the 
unauthorized posting.
136
 Further, even if a Porn 2.0 victim does complain to an ISP about the 
continued availability of an unauthorized posting, the ISP may still be shielded from any third-
party liability under the Communications Decency Act  (“CDA”). 
Enacted in 1996, the CDA was passed to “promote the continued development of Internet 
and other interactive computer services.”137 In order to effectuate this purpose, § 230 of the CDA 
includes the following “Good Samaritan” provision: “No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”138 The CDA goes on to define the phrase “interactive 
computer service” to mean “any information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”139  Further, the phrase “information 
content provider” is defined by the CDA as, “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.”140 Thus, the language of § 230 draws an important distinction 
between an ISP who merely publishes information provided by third parties and is therefore 
protected by the Act’s provisions, and the party who actually creates or develops the same 
information who is not protected by the Act.
141
  
                                                        
136
  Ronneburger, supra note 18, at 11.  
137
   Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(1) (West 2011).  
138
  Id. at § 230(c)(1).  
139
  Id. at § 230(f)(2).  
140
  Id. at § 230(f)(3).  
141
  MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, No. Civ.A.3:02 CV 2727 G, 2004 WL 833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
19, 2004).  
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The protection provided to ISPs by § 230 however is not unlimited.
142
 Section 230(e)(1) 
explicitly provides that “[n]othing in [§ 230] shall be construed to impair the enforcement of [47 
U.S.C.S. §§ 223 or 231] (relating to obscenity) or [18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1460 et seq. or §§ 2251 et. 
seq.] (relating to sexual exploitation of children) . . . , or any other Federal criminal statute.”143 
As a result, an ISP will not be protected by § 230 with respect to content distributed the ISP’s 
services that is considered obscene and/or involves certain underage victims.
144
 
Courts that have interpreted § 230 outside of the context of obscenity or child 
pornography generally have done so broadly, finding that the section immunizes ISPs for any 
harm caused by third-party content disseminated through the ISP’s service.145 For example, 
§ 230 has been applied to “preempt claims for defamation, negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation,
 
negligent undertaking, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
 
harassment,
 
tortuous interference with contractual relations or business expectancy,
 
breach of contract, 
privacy and publicity claims, unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting, . . . strict product liability, 
state consumer protection . . . and unfair competition laws,” to name only a few.146 
The leading case in the construction of § 230 was Zeran v. American Online, Inc., where 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit broadly interpreted § 230 to immunize ISPs from 
negligence claims premised on liability for a third-party’s acts of defamation.147 The plaintiff in 
Zeran received multiple threatening phone calls in response to messages - posted on an 
American Online (“AOL”) bulletin board – that advertised t-shirts mocking the Oklahoma City 
                                                        
142
  See CDA at § 230(e).  
143
  Id. at § 230(e)(1).   
144
  But see Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 558 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant MySpace was entitled to § 
230 immunity and had no duty to implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators from 
communicating with minors on its website).  
145
  See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com. Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing cases); Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., No. Civ. 05-926-AA, 2005 WL 3005602, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 8, 2005), overruled by Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).  
146
  BALLON, supra note 32, at § 37.05[1][C] (footnotes omitted) (citing cases).  
147
  See Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).  
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bombing and included the plaintiff’s name and contact information.148 Zeran alerted AOL on 
multiple occasions that it was an anonymous third-party, and not he, who posted the offensive 
messages.
149
 However, despite Zeran’s efforts, AOL did not immediately remove the posts, and 
in accordance with the company’s policies, AOL refused to post a retraction.150 In response, 
Zeran brought a negligence action against AOL, but the district court granted judgment for AOL 
on the grounds that § 230 barred Zeran’s claims.151 On appeal, Zeran argued, among other 
things, that § 230 did not shield AOL because the provider possessed actual notice of the 
defamatory material that was posted through the use of the provider’s services.152 The Fourth 
Circuit disagreed, reading the plain language of § 230 to create a “federal immunity” for service 
providers with respect to “any cause of action that would make [them] liable for information 
originating with a third-party user of the service.”153 Reasoning that this holding was consistent 
with Congress’ intent in enacting § 230, the court stated: “Congress made a policy choice [], not 
to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies 
that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages.”154 
In light of the Fourth Circuit’s broad holding in Zeran, and the plain language of § 230, 
courts have repeatedly held that § 230 immunizes an ISP from simply hosting user-generated 
content.
155
 However, the rationale announced in Zeran has also been applied by courts to 
immunize ISPs from third-party liability.   These are circumstances where an ISP went beyond 
                                                        
148
  Id. at 329. 
149
  Id.  
150
  Id. 
151
  Id. at 328. 
152
   Id.  
153
  Id. at 330.  
154
  Id. at 330-31. 
155
  Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419-20 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasoning that it was 
irrelevant that “the ‘construct and operation’ of the [defendant’s Internet message board] might have some 
influence on the content of the postings.”); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(reasoning that in “each instance raised by plaintiff’s  tort claims, [defendant Internet search engine] either 
archived, cached, or simply provided access to content that was created by a third party.”), aff'd, 242 F. App'x 
833 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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simply hosting third-party content.
156
 For example, courts have held that ISPs are immunized 
where the ISP reposted third-party content onto other websites, even where the plaintiff alleged 
that the ISP modified the content of the original posting.
157
 Similarly, courts have held that ISPs 
are immunized where they merely exercise their editorial rights, which courts have found to 
broadly include the rights to “make minor changes to the spelling, grammar and length of third-
party content,”158 and the rights to “[D]ecide whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter 
[third-party] content.”159 Additionally, courts have held that ISPs are immunized under § 230 
despite the fact that the service paid for, and even advertised, a third-party’s illegal content,160 or 
despite the fact that the service failed to remove a third-party’s illegal content even after the 
original author of such content expressly asked the service to remove the content.
161
 
More recent court decisions have reexamined the scope of the protection provided by § 
230. Several courts have held that ISPs are not protected by § 230 where they have intentionally 
elicited illegal content from their users.
162
 For example, in Hy Cite Corp. v. 
Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C, the district court found that the plaintiff’s allegations that the 
                                                        
156
  See infra text accompanying notes 157-61.  
157
  See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the defendant website operator immunized 
under § 230 where the plaintiff alleged the defendant re-posted a third-party’s allegedly defamatory email under 
the reasoning that the defendant “did no more than select and make minor alterations” to the email); Doe v. 
Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding the defendant website operator 
immunized under § 230 even though the operator re-posted an allegedly false and unauthorized personal 
advertisement about the plaintiff on other websites after making “slight” modifications to the ad). 
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  See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1070, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
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  Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 n.18 (citing Zeran v. American Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).  
160
 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50-51 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that defendant AOL was immune 
under § 230 with respect to allegedly defamatory statements that were made by a third-party gossip columnist 
with whom AOL had a license agreement where AOL had promoted the third-party to its subscribers and 
potential subscribers as a specific reason to subscribe to AOL’s services).  
161
  See Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz. 2008).  
162
  See Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1165 (where an en banc court for the Ninth Circuit held that § 230 did not 
immunize a website operator who “both elicit[ed] the allegedly illegal content and ma[de] aggressive use of it in 
conducting its business.”); NPS, LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Supp. Jan. 
26, 2009) (holding that the defendant website ticket reseller was not entitled to § 230 immunity with respect to  
plaintiff’s tortious interference claim where there was evidence that the defendant contributed to illegal ticket 
scalping by the site’s users). 
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defendant website operator posted false and defamatory statements on its site, “arguably could 
support a finding that [the] Defendants are responsible . . . for the creation or development of 
information provided by [third-party users] in response to [the] Defendants’ solicitation.”163  One 
Circuit court has found that an ISP was not protected by § 230 where the ISP specifically 
promised to take down allegedly legal content.
164
 Additionally, even courts that have ultimately 
held that § 230 applied to immunize an ISP under the present circumstances have cautioned, in 
dicta, of the potential dangers from an overbroad reading of such protection.
165
 For example, in 
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that despite case law to the contrary, “Subsection 
(c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.”166  
In the future, hopefully more courts will follow these courts’ lead in narrowing the scope 
of § 230’s protection.  
 
IV. A TIME FOR CHANGE 
Broad interpretations of § 230’s grant of protection may have been necessary at first. 
Admittedly, one of the announced purposes of § 230’s protection is “to promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive services.”167 However, the Internet is no longer 
in its initial stages of development,
168
 and nowhere in the language of § 230 did Congress use the 
                                                        
163
  Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005).  
164
  See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that § 230 did not preclude the 
plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim where plaintiff alleged to have detrimentally relied on defendant’s promise 
to take down third-party content that had been posted on the defendant’s site).  
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Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1314 (2010). 
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questioned whether § 230 creates any form of “immunity.” See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 
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all-encompassing word “immunize.”169 Further, time has shown that individuals use the Internet, 
including Porn 2.0, as a tool of embarrassment and revenge.
170
  Time has further shown that ISPs 
use § 230 as a shield for their own ill motives.
171
 Yet despite this change in circumstances, the 
actual language of § 230, and the realities of Porn 2.0 and § 230, courts have generally continued 
to broadly construe § 230’s grant of protection and have provided ISPs with almost absolute 
protection.
172
 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Zeran, the plain language of § 230 does not 
provide ISPs with “immunity” with respect to liability for information originating with third-
parties. This sweeping protection is entirely the product of the courts. The plain language of § 
230 protects ISPs with respect to third-party content, the creation and development of which the 
service is not responsible for, in whole or in part.
173
 Further, § 230 protects those good faith ISPs 
who voluntarily restrict access to, or the availability of, third-party content distributed through 
their service.
174
 The language of the CDA certainly does not protect ISPs who, arguably in bad 
faith, do not take affirmative action to remove third-party content when they have actual notice 
that such content may be illegal. Thus, at the very least, Porn 2.0 victims should be able to find 
relief in the form of a requirement that ISPs – who have actual notice from a victim of Porn 2.0 - 
take affirmative steps to remove illegal and unauthorized content being distributed through their 
service. Those ISPs who have received notice of illegal content on their site, should no longer be 
shielded by courts’ overbroad interpretations of § 230. 
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